

part: the other is called *τοπική*, as much to saye, as the finding parte.³

Then *κριτική* itself falls typically into three parts, which Lever calls; 1 words, 2 sayings, or sentences, 3 reasons. Since Lever discusses only the true and not false reasonings, his work thus naturally falls into four books.

Robert Sanderson in 1615 connects these divisions with their Aristotelian sources.

Ejus [logicae] tres sunt partes, pro numero actuum mentis ab eâ dirigibilium: quarum *Prima* dirigit primum actum Mentis, sc. *Conceptum simplicem*; & est de *Simplicibus terminis*: quò pertinent introductio Porphyriana, & Liber Categoriarum Aristotelis.

Secunda dirigit secundum actum Mentis, sc. *Compositionem & Divisionem*; & est de *Propositione*: quò spectat Liber de Interpretatione.

Tertia dirigit tertium & vltimum Mētis actum, sc. *Discursum*, & est de *Argumentatione & Methodo*: quò spectant Analyticorum Priorum libri duo, totidémq; posteriorum, octo Topicorum, Elenchorum demùm duo.⁴

Thus Sanderson groups Lever's reasons and topics together as a third book, instead of making two books out of them as Lever had done.

Seton in 1545 had used the division which Lever later followed. Wilson in 1551 had followed the same order as Seton, but adding a section on false reasons.

Hetherto we haue treated of the former parte of logique called in latine *Iuditium*, that is to saye, Iudgement, or skill, to declare the nature of euery worde seuerallie, to set the same wordes in a perfecte sentence, and to knitte them vp in argument, so that hereby we myght with ease espie, the ryght frame in matters, howe they agree beyng lapped vp in order. Nowe therefore the other parte shalbe sette forth whiche is called *Inuentio*, whereby we maie finde argumentes, and reasons, mete to proue eucry matter where vpon question maie ryse. This parte is the store house of places wherin argumentes rest.⁵

Nowe that I haue declared, what an argumēt is, what the places of inuencion bee, how thei serue for the confirmacion of any matter, howe euery thyng is made, in his due mode, and figure, and also shewed the obseruaciō of many thynges, wherby any one, shall bothe be assured, that his argument is true, (if it be made accordyng to the rules) & also may know that it is false, if it be not made accordyng to the same rules: I wil frō hence furthe, set out the maner of deceptfull argumentes, called in Latine, *reprehensiones*, or *fallaces conclusiunculae*, euen as Aristotle hath set thē furth.⁶

³ Lever, R., *The Arte of Reason, rightly termed, Witcraft* (1573, copy in University of Illinois Library), p. 138.

⁴ Sanderson, Robert, *Logicae Artis Compendium* (Oxford, 1618, personal), pp. 2-3. This second edition is the earliest that I have seen.

⁵ Wilson, *Reason* (1551), p. 14v.

⁶ Wilson, *Reason* (1551), p. P4v.